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INTRODUCTION 
Traditional public housing in the United States is currently undergo-
ing conversion to a program called the Rental Assistance Demonstration 
(“RAD”).1 Created by Julián Castro’s Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) administration during President Obama’s tenure,2 RAD has al-
ready been adopted by Public Housing Authorities (“PHA”) from San 
Francisco to Baltimore.3 In 2017, RAD came to New York City, where 
Mayor Bill de Blasio and the New York City Housing Authority, collo-
quially known as NYCHA, have aggressively embraced the program.4 
NYCHA is by far the largest PHA in the country, housing more individ-
uals than many mid-size American cities.5 Through the rise and fall of 
New York City’s fortunes, NYCHA has been one of the stalwarts of af-
fordable housing in the city since the first NYCHA buildings were con-
structed in the 1930s.6 In New York, which has some of the most cata-
strophically high rents in the country—if not the world—and where 
hyper-gentrification has decimated long-standing working-class commu-
nities of color,7 NYCHA is the last large-scale bastion of deeply afforda-
ble housing throughout the five boroughs. More than that, public housing, 
beginning with NYCHA, was one of the great public works projects of 
the 20th century, and supporters of the first public housing developments 
advocated for housing as a “‘public enterprise’ in the same category as 
transportation and education.”8 
While NYCHA has endured, it is not without serious problems. Be-
ginning in the 1970s, public housing was maligned as part of the welfare 
state and fell out of favor as the public embraced a burgeoning neoliberal 
economic ideology.9 As public housing became more unpopular in the 
 
 1 Shamus Roller & Jessica Cassella, The Promise and Peril of HUD’s RAD Program, 
SHELTERFORCE (July 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/4USE-Z6HA. 
 2 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-55, § 4, 
125 Stat. 552, 673. 
 3 Roller & Casella, supra note 1. 
 4 Amir Khafagy, NYCHA’s Embrace of RAD Program Brings a Mix of Praise and 
Worry, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/NMT4-Y3MR. 
 5 N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., NYCHA 2019 FACT SHEET 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/BW53-
J8HP. 
 6 Id. 
 7 SAMUEL STEIN, CAPITAL CITY: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REAL ESTATE STATE 3-4 
(2019); see also JEREMIAH MOSS, VANISHING NEW YORK: HOW A GREAT CITY LOST ITS SOUL 
passim (2017). 
 8 Public Housing Asked by Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1934, at L18, 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1934/06/29/93762064.pdf. 
 9 David Erickson, The Housing Policy Revolution, COMMUNITY INV., Winter 2009/2010, 
at 24, 25-27, https://perma.cc/B2VE-BHCC; see Ganesh Sitaraman, The Collapse of Neolib-
eralism, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/GT3Z-UFWN. 
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public consciousness, the federal government responded with a series of 
budget cuts over the ensuing decades.10 Budget shortfalls coupled with an 
aging housing stock have led to serious deficiencies in the infrastructure 
of the buildings, and some estimates to repair NYCHA properties total as 
much as $32 billion.11 
In an effort to close the funding deficit hampering the nation’s 
PHAs,12 HUD created the RAD program, which proposes new regulatory 
agreements to convert PHAs to project-based Section 8 vouchers.13 After 
the agreements are made, private landlords offer bids to act as a manage-
ment company by maintaining the property and overseeing day-to-day 
operations while collecting rent. 14 So far, public housing advocates in 
New York have generally supported the RAD program because it has 
been proffered as the only feasible option to get the funding NYCHA 
needs to make necessary repairs.15 Advocates and city government offi-
cials believe that it is more advisable to accept private capital in the short 
term than to hold out for federal funding that likely will never arrive.16 
One of the things that most concerns tenants and some advocates is 
whether RAD amounts to a privatization of NYCHA. NYCHA itself, in 
conjunction with the city and HUD, has repeatedly emphasized that RAD 
is not a program of privatization: a brochure about RAD published by 
NYCHA states that “this is a public-private partnership . . . . NYCHA 
will enter into long-term lease agreements with development partners that 
will repair and manage the properties.”17 The same brochure attempts to 
dispel fears of total loss of public control by declaring that “NYCHA will 
 
 10 VICTOR BACH, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, PUBLIC HOUSING: NEW YORK’S THIRD CITY 3 
(2017), https://perma.cc/3DFY-JP7S. 
 11 Katie Honan, Repair Costs for NYCHA Properties Skyrocket to $31.8 Billion, WALL 
ST. J. (July 2, 2018, 8:40 PM), https://perma.cc/39A4-RNEB. 
 12 See Pam Fessler, Trump Administration Wants to Cut Funding for Public Housing Re-
pairs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 16, 2019, 11:39 AM), https://perma.cc/5Y9B-8PLK. 
 13 Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., https://
perma.cc/PHJ8-CXPS (last visited May 7, 2020) (“RAD was created in order to give public 
housing authorities (PHAs) a powerful tool to preserve and improve public housing properties 
and address the $26 billion dollar nationwide backlog of deferred maintenance.”); see Emma 
Whitford, NYCHA Residents and Advocates Fear City’s Revised Privatization Plan Will Put 
Tenant Rights at Risk, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 23, 2019, 11:39 AM), https://perma.cc/555Z-9Y8E. 
 14 NAT’L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, AN ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO PUBLIC HOUSING CONVERSIONS 
UNDER COMPONENT 1 OF THE RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION 6-7 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/6PQJ-5S94; Roller & Casella, supra note 1. 
 15 See Alicia Glen, Why We Can’t Fix Affordable Housing: It Isn’t from Lack of Trying, 
CITYLAB (Oct. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/B8ME-PYWC. 
 16 Id.; see also Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Make NYCHA Great Again: A Progressive 
Mayor’s Obligation, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/F6LJ-
FUQS. 
 17 N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., CREATING A PERMANENT AFFORDABILITY COMMITMENT TOGE-
THER: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2019), https://perma.cc/KTT3-QB76. 
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continue to own the land and buildings.”18 In this sense, RAD does not 
meet a strict definition of privatization, where ownership is transferred 
from municipal control to the private sector.19 However, many residents 
are skeptical of NYCHA’s claims, and there are sufficient indications that 
RAD is merely the initial step towards dismantling public housing en-
tirely.20 
How did NYCHA, one of the great public works programs of the 20th 
century, find itself in this position? In this Note, I argue that NYCHA and 
PHAs across the country have been subject to a quasi “shock doctrine,” a 
term coined by Naomi Klein to describe a form of neoliberalism that ex-
ploits a disaster in order to privatize public goods.21 The fiscal disaster 
facing PHAs that allowed for the private market to step in has developed 
over decades of budget cuts beginning with the austerity and deregulation 
of the 1970s neoliberal agenda.22 Simultaneous with the rise of neoliberal 
economics was the integration of public housing. As public housing be-
came racially diverse after enforcement of the Civil Rights Act, largely 
white public housing residents were forced to integrate with communities 
of color, and politicians began to criticize and defund public housing.23 
By the 1990s, the reality of the public housing projects in New York City 
matched the discriminatory rhetoric peddled by politicians.24 People took 
for granted that public housing could not sustain itself and that it would 
require outside assistance to be rescued. This in turn set the stage for leg-
islation that would allow private players to get involved in the manage-
ment of NYCHA buildings and ultimately profit through a complex sys-
tem of tax abatements and city contracts. 
The goal of this paper is twofold: first, to show that PHAs, and more 
specifically NYCHA, did not reach this point through mismanagement,25 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 For a strict definition of privatization, see Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How 
of Privatization: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S23, S24 (1992). 
 20 For a discussion of the uncertainties of permanent affordability under RAD, see infra 
Section III.C. 
 21 NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 7 (2010). 
 22 See infra Sections I.B and C for a discussion of the rise of the ideology of austerity and 
subsequent budget cuts to public housing. 
 23 LAWRENCE J. VALE, PURGING THE POOREST: PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE DESIGN POLITICS 
OF TWICE-CLEARED COMMUNITIES 16-18 (2013); Luis Ferré-Sadurní, The Rise and Fall of New 
York Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/E5UB-ADKU. 
 24 Jarrett Murphy, Chapter 2: The Life and Times of Public Housing, CITY LIMITS (Jan. 
10, 2009), https://perma.cc/Y7V5-JCZT; Richard Rothstein, Race and Public Housing: Re-
visiting the Federal Role, POVERTY & RACE, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 1, 2, 15-16, https://perma.cc/
EGX4-CAT8. 
 25 While mismanagement was certainly an issue in some PHAs, it is not the focus of this 
paper and, I believe, not nearly as important a factor as severe funding cuts over a prolonged 
period. 
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nor through the failures of the public housing residents themselves. After 
decades of funding the construction of hundreds of thousands of units 
across the country,26 public housing was subject to an intentional defund-
ing scheme beginning in the 1970s, a time of both racial integration and 
a burgeoning economic ideology of neoliberalism that led to massive 
budget cuts, leaving PHAs without the funding they needed to survive.27 
The first section discusses the history of public housing—demonstrating 
how NYCHA has always been carefully controlled by the philanthropic 
goals of the wealthy and backed by federal funding—and how it was sub-
sequently abandoned once it became more racially diverse and public 
housing as a philanthropic goal fell out of favor. 
The second goal of the paper is to show that the current RAD scheme 
is a bold step toward privatizing public housing. Unlike the wealthy New 
York elites who were interested in housing the poor at the turn of the 20th 
century, current wealthy elites are mainly capital investors who realize 
that NYCHA buildings are on extremely valuable land, owing to the re-
surgence of New York in the 1980s and 1990s.28 This realization has cre-
ated a new partnership between HUD and private investors in the form of 
RAD. Although the regulatory agreements to convert public housing 
through RAD contain protections for residents to maintain their current 
levels of affordability, there are good reasons to believe that this is the 
beginning of a chain of events that will lead to transfer of ownership to 
the private market, as that will yield the largest profits for the private in-
vestors. Indeed, as we have seen in other privatization schemes, including 
charter schools, private prisons, and medical services, private actors do 
not always provide a superior service but rather are looking for exploita-
ble loopholes to maximize their profits.29 Because of public housing’s 
history as a tool for elite interests, coupled with some suspicious loop-
holes in the RAD regulatory agreements, I argue that RAD is a calculated, 
 
 26 The Housing Act of 1949 authorized the construction of 810,000 units nationwide. U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MAJOR LEGISLATION ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
ENACTED SINCE 1932 (2014), https://perma.cc/8SM3-RFQE; see NICHOLAS DAGEN BLOOM, 
PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKED: NEW YORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 117 (2008). 
 27 Justin R. La Mort, Public Housing and Public Health: The Separate and Unequal Pro-
tection of Private and Public Housing Tenants’ Health in New York City, 27 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 385, 395 (2018); Rothstein, supra note 24, at 1-2, 15-16. 
 28 Peter Dreier, Philanthropy and the Housing Crisis: The Dilemmas of Private Charity 
and Public Policy, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 235, 238-39 (1997); see also Sean Campion, 
NYCHA’s Untapped Assets, CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N (Oct. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/9775-
AYTA. 
 29 For more information on the perils of various privatization schemes, see IN THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/ (last visited May 7, 2020). In the Public Inter-
est (ITPI) is a comprehensive research and policy center focused on privatization and respon-
sible contracting. 
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logical, and predictable step toward privatization after a decades-long de-
funding agenda, fueled by racist rhetoric and neoliberal economics, that 
began in the 1970s. 
I. THE HISTORY OF NYCHA 
A. Origins of NYCHA: The Movement for Public Housing in 19th 
Century New York and London 
To understand how privatization became a viable option for public 
housing in New York, it is important to understand the rise and fall of 
NYCHA through the 20th century: the original promise of stable urban 
dwellings for the working class; the subsequent experiments and im-
provements; and ultimately the neglect, decline, and stagnation that laid 
the groundwork for  RAD’s implementation in the early 2010s.30 The his-
tory of NYCHA closely tracks the shifts in political ideology that took 
place over the course of the 20th century in America, from the creation of 
large public works projects during and after the Great Depression to the 
economic doctrine of deregulation and neoliberalism in the 1970s and 
1980s.31 Support for public housing has always been closely tied to the 
interests of wealthy elites who lobby the government:32 in the early 20th 
century, it was a popular idea eagerly embraced by many;33 by the 1970s, 
it was considered a failure and defunded;34 and today, elites are once again 
embracing it—provided they are able to extract a profit.35 
The groundwork for the ideology and implementation of public 
housing stems from the squalid conditions in which many New Yorkers 
lived in the mid-to-late 19th century and the joint efforts of philanthropists 
and the government to reform that housing. Over the course of many dec-
ades, wealthy city dwellers took a dual approach, lobbying the state leg-
islature to enact a comprehensive tenement building code that would raise 
tenement standards and engaging in the construction of charitable housing 
for the poor, a forerunner of government-funded public housing in the 
1930s.36 
While the movement to reform slum housing can be traced back to 
the early 19th century, it first gained momentum during New York City’s 
 
 30 See infra Sections I.B.1 and 2. 
 31 151 Years of America’s Housing History, NATION (May 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/
7EBT-3TB8. 
 32 See RICHARD PLUNZ, A HISTORY OF HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 10, 34-36 (rev. ed. 
2016). 
 33 See BLOOM, supra note 26, at 40-41. 
 34 See VALE, supra note 23, at 20. 
 35 See infra Section III.C. 
 36 PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 21-22, 88. 
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expansion after the Civil War. In 1865, the Citizens’ Association of New 
York, a group of upper-class New Yorkers concerned about the health and 
welfare of the burgeoning immigrant population in New York, pushed the 
state to investigate conditions in tenement housing.37 “Tenements” under 
the law were broadly defined to include nearly any structure with at least 
three families “living independently of one another.”38 This encompassed 
a diverse array of structures that had cropped up in New York over the 
course of the 19th century, including tenements, cellars, rookeries, and 
squatter shacks.39 At the time, there were hardly any laws regulating 
building construction in New York, and tenement buildings had few if 
any windows, no running water, and little chance of escape in case of a 
fire.40 Disease and overcrowding were rampant.41 Ultimately, the shock-
ingly substandard conditions that were uncovered led to the passage of 
the Tenement House Act in 1867.42 
The changes to tenement structures encouraged by the law were 
fairly limited in scope, mainly requiring fire escapes on the exterior of 
tenement buildings and some minimum standards for water closets and 
air shafts.43 Although the city delegated enforcement responsibilities to 
the newly created Metropolitan Board of Health and the Department of 
Survey and Inspection of Buildings, the new code’s implementation was 
spotty in a rapidly growing city noted for its corruption and inefficient 
bureaucracy.44 The regulations themselves failed to fully address the poor 
quality of life for the largely immigrant population inhabiting tenements. 
For example, even after the passage of the Tenement House Act, air shafts 
remained too narrow to provide meaningful air or light, and in some cases 
created just enough of a vent to actually increase the risk of fire.45 These 
apartment blocks were often referred to as “dumb-bell” tenements, be-
cause the air shaft between buildings was so narrow that, from above, the 
space resembled a dumb-bell.46 
Passage of the early tenement regulations, while mostly ineffective 
at raising the standards of existing tenements, did help raise awareness of 
the intractable substandard conditions of tenements in both philanthropic 
 
 37 Id. at 21-22. 
 38 Id. at 22. 
 39 See id. at 5-6. 
 40 Id. at 15 (quoting Homes of Poor People, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 8, 1882, at 10). 
 41 See generally JACOB RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES (1890). 
 42 See PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 22. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 22-23. 
 45 THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM: INCLUDING THE REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE 
TENEMENT HOUSE COMMISSION OF 1900, at 371 (Robert W. DeForest & Lawrence Veiller eds., 
1903). 
 46 Id.; see PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 45-56. 
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and government circles. In 1890, the publication of Jacob Riis’s How the 
Other Half Lives was another shocking catalyst that finally prompted 
meaningful government intervention.47 Riis’s report contained brutally 
candid photos of squalid tenement and slum conditions that horrified the 
city elites.48 Outrage over the conditions depicted was widespread enough 
amongst the city’s power brokers that the state legislature was finally 
prompted to act, starting with a series of investigations and reports.49 A 
New York State Assembly report in 1894 on tenement housing found that 
while New York City was only the sixth most populous city in the world, 
it was by far the most densely populated, particularly in the slum neigh-
borhoods on the Lower East Side.50 The report also found that over half 
of the city’s population was living in tenement housing.51 After over a 
decade of state reports and investigations, the philanthropic community 
successfully advocated for the passage of a comprehensive tenement 
building code via the Tenement House Act of 1901.52 The Act finally cre-
ated enforceable standards that form the foundation of the modern build-
ing code today, including set-backs on lots, sizeable air shafts, and indoor 
toilets.53 
In the last decades of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s, 
philanthropists also toyed with building low-income housing themselves. 
Some of these projects were designed as “model tenements” and were 
meant to encourage other developers to construct more sanitary and safe 
tenements.54 Model tenements designed by the building designer City and 
Suburban, for example, described how their apartments were complete 
“homes” with ample air and light in each room, full bathrooms, and run-
ning water in each apartment, and most of the other amenities we identify 
with a functional apartment in New York today.55 Many of these projects 
were small in scale, in part because government subsidies being offered 
at the time were small, and the cost of land in New York had increased 
 
 47 Jacob Riis: Revealing “How the Other Half Lives,” LIBRARY OF CONG., https://
perma.cc/Y9C7-GKCP (last visited May 9, 2020). 
 48 Id.; RIIS, supra note 41, at 45, 51, 69, 87. 
 49 Riis, supra note 47. 
 50 Report of the Tenement House Committee of 1894, N.Y. State Assemb., 18th Legis. 
Sess., No. 37, at 10-11 (1895), https://perma.cc/MYK6-ZPQ3. 
 51 Id. at 12. 
 52 PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 36-37, 47. 
 53 Id. at 47. 
 54 Andrew S. Dolkart, City and Suburban Homes Company, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN 
NEW YORK 50 (Nicholas Dagen Bloom & Matthew Gordon Lasner eds., 2016). 
 55 Id.; LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION, LP-1694, DESIGNATION LIST 224, at 14 
(1990), https://perma.cc/JK7E-HU6K. 
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exponentially in the last decades of the 1800s.56 As long as the govern-
ment was not purchasing the land or using their existing land for projects, 
the cost was prohibitive enough to prevent large-scale development.57 
Early developers of philanthropic housing saw themselves as provid-
ing the working class with the stepping-stone of clean, affordable housing 
on their way to the true goal of owning a single-family home in subur-
bia.58 As a result, many of these early housing projects tried to recruit 
“model” families that could eventually ascend into a higher socioeco-
nomic class. To screen for this type of tenant, developers created exacting 
codes of rules and regulation founded in upper-class notions of morality, 
an early forerunner of the strict rules that would eventually govern 
NYCHA.59 
Notions of who constituted the “deserving poor” were central to the 
construction of early model tenements60 and were influenced by efforts to 
reform housing for the poor already underway in England.61 The concept 
of a certain class deserving public benefits, such as housing and 
healthcare, is derived from the work of Octavia Hill, a leading proponent 
of public housing in early 19th-century London.62 Moralistic notions of 
how the rich need to control the behavior of the poor reach well back into 
England’s past: Hill’s efforts have their roots in the passage of the Statutes 
of Labourers in 1350, which made it the law for every able-bodied Eng-
lishman under 60 to work.63 During a severe labor shortage resulting from 
the breakdown of the feudal structure and the devastation of the Black 
 
 56 PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 93; Eillie Anzilotti, The Long, Complicated History of Afford-
able Housing in New York, CITY LAB (Feb. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/7YEN-VWK6. 
 57 Matthew Gordon Lasner, Paul Laurence Dunbar Apartments, in AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING IN NEW YORK, supra note 54, at 52-53. 
 58 PLUNZ, supra note 32, at 93. Ultimately, though, public housing as a means of achiev-
ing homeownership was only available to white families, as the growth of suburbia in the mid-
20th century was largely shaped by redlining practices and effectively trapped families of color 
in what was supposed to be a stepping-stone to their own suburban home ownership. See gen-
erally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW passim (2017). 
 59 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 78-79. 
 60 See generally VALE, supra note 23, at 1-38. 
 61 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 78; see also Robert H. Bremner, “An Iron Scepter Twined 
with Roses”: The Octavia Hill System of Housing Management, 39 SOC. SERV. REV. 222, 227-
29 (1965). 
 62 Bremner, supra note 61, at 224-25. 
 63 William P. Quigley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Mille-
nium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 102 
(1998). 
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Plague, England passed the Poor Laws, which obligated destitute individ-
uals to work.64 These laws profoundly impacted the American conception 
of poverty.65 
Octavia Hill, whose charity efforts were funded by wealthy English 
aristocrats, sent employees to each apartment weekly to collect rent and 
determine if repairs were needed.66 Employees also monitored tenants to 
ensure that they maintained lives consistent with Hill’s moral concep-
tions. Hill believed that “an inexorable demand for rent and an inflexible 
insistence on obedience to rules” were necessary “for strengthening the 
character of tenants.”67 This view was adopted by City and Suburban, a 
developer constructing model tenements in pre-Depression New York 
City, which mainly accepted working, married couples with children as 
tenants, a demographic professed to be the spitting image of the “deserv-
ing poor.”68 Like Hill, City and Suburban routinely sent employees to ob-
serve and record tenants’ behavior, evicting those who did not live up to 
their standards.69 This system of exchanging access to low-income hous-
ing for adherence to strict behavioral regulations was later adopted by 
NYCHA.70 Until 1968, applicants for NYCHA apartments were screened 
for any pattern of “alcoholism, irregular work history, single motherhood 
and lack of furniture.”71 
It is important to understand public housing’s roots in the concerns 
of the philanthropic class, beginning with Octavia Hill in England, be-
cause public housing, along with other welfare programs, is a manifesta-
tion of the ruling class’s imposition of a set of moral values that aim to 
guide the behavior of the poor.72 Despite the fact that public housing was 
a vision created and enacted by the wealthy, our conception of poverty, 
which is rooted in the Elizabethan Poor Laws, ensures that we focus on 
the failings of the individual recipients of assistance and whether they 
have fulfilled the obligations set out by their wealthy benefactors.73 As 
Lawrence Vale notes in Purging the Poorest, “city, state, and national 
officials have long treated housing assistance as a moral good, linking it 
to an overarching emphasis on the importance of hard work as evidence 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 103-07. 
 66 See Bremner, supra note 61, at 223, 225. 
 67 Id. at 225. 
 68 Dolkart, supra note 54, at 48, 51. 
 69 Id. at 52. 
 70 BLOOM, supra note 26, at 94-95. 
 71 Ferré-Sadurní, supra note 23. 
 72 VALE, supra note 23, at 3-6. 
 73 Id. at 2-4; Quigley, supra note 63, at 102. 
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of strong personal character and responsibility.”74 When public housing 
began to fail, society could reason that the poor were to blame for not 
living in accordance with moral standards imposed by the rich. Not coin-
cidentally, public housing began to be perceived by the public as a failure 
when the white working-class families that originally constituted the ma-
jority of the tenants began to move to the suburbs and Black and Brown 
families took their place.75 
B. The Creation of NYCHA and Early Developments 
Public housing historians typically break up public housing’s history 
into three distinct segments. First, from the mid-1930s to the late-1960s, 
public housing was predicated on “model housing as a municipal ser-
vice.”76 During this period, public housing mostly served upwardly mo-
bile white working-class families.77 In New York, where the first public 
housing in the country was constructed, this period was characterized by 
an optimism about the utility of public goods across the city.78 The next 
period, from the late-1960s to the 1990s, was characterized by pressure 
from civil rights advocates to desegregate, which forced public housing 
to accept much more racially diverse tenants.79 In New York, these dec-
ades were marked by white flight, which devastated the city tax base, and 
by the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, which gave rise to a new socioeco-
nomic ideology of austerity.80 Nationally, this period also saw the first 
serious backlash against public housing, culminating in the demolition of 
the Pruitt-Igoe Houses in St. Louis in 197281 and the moratorium on pub-
lic housing construction put in place by Richard Nixon.82 Finally, the pe-
riod from the 1990s to present day is characterized by budget cuts at all 
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levels of government so severe that the physical infrastructure of many 
developments has either failed or begun to fail, laying the groundwork for 
possible privatization.83 The next several sections examine these three 
time periods as they relate to NYCHA. NYCHA is a unique lens through 
which to examine public housing in the United States because many other 
PHAs that were initially underfunded were unable to survive a mixture of 
mismanagement and savage budget cuts beginning in the 1970s.84 
NYCHA, on the other hand, had a relatively stable management structure 
and continued receiving sufficient city and state funding to enable its sur-
vival, although that has not been the case in recent years.85 
Although the public housing crisis has roots in the budget cuts of 
austerity politics, the popular conception of public housing is that it is a 
failure of the poor who live in the developments, and specifically a failure 
of the people of color who began to inhabit public housing in the 1960s.86 
As mentioned previously, public housing began with strict moral codes 
and was explicitly intended for the white working class, which affected 
public housing policy for decades after.87 Budget cuts began shortly after 
civil rights advocates forced public housing to accept non-white resi-
dents.88 Public housing was adequately funded during the era when it was 
majority white and was ignored and mismanaged when it became racially 
diverse. Once public housing filled with Black and Brown families, who 
were trapped in cities due to redlining practices,89 and the budget cuts 
began, the public became much more comfortable turning against public 
housing and open to market-based solutions.90 
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1. Political Will for Construction in the 1930s 
Housing reformers in New York City finally had their opportunity to 
persuade the federal government to seriously invest in public housing in 
the early 1930s. The moment was ripe for a number of reasons: the onset 
of the Depression meant that construction in the city had ground to a halt, 
so the powerful construction trades were clamoring for work and the fed-
eral government was eager to create jobs; thousands of old-law tenements 
that did not comply with 20th-century building codes persisted and con-
tinued to be extreme hazards for the poor of the city; and urban planners 
saw an opportunity to get rid of blighted tenements as a means of bringing 
New York City in line with the then-fashionable public housing com-
plexes being constructed throughout Europe.91 In Vienna, for example, 
the newly-established socialist government had spent much of the 1920s 
building public housing for a broad swath of its residents, and today 62% 
of the city residents still live in some form of social housing.92 Mayor 
Fiorello La Guardia, elected as a reform candidate in November 1933 in 
part based on his support for public housing construction, often cited Vi-
enna and other European cities that were aggressively building public 
housing as models New York City should follow.93 New York Senator 
Robert Wagner spoke of public housing as a public good like “free 
schools, free roads, and free parks.”94 
The bill that created housing authorities throughout the state, includ-
ing NYCHA, was passed in January 1934.95 The first few developments 
in Harlem and Williamsburg were constructed with Public Works Admin-
istration (PWA) funding,96 quickly followed by the Housing Act of 1937 
and the subsequent Housing Act of 1949,97 which permitted larger-scale, 
permanent federal funding that enabled NYCHA’s rapid expansion as 
well as public housing across the country.98 Mayor La Guardia, his suc-
cessor Mayor William O’Dwyer, and the ever-present urban planner Rob-
ert Moses kept up a furious construction pace, building the majority of 
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NYCHA developments in the 1940s and 1950s.99 What made this era 
unique was city and state officials’ commitment to building public hous-
ing. During World War II and immediately after, New York officials ag-
gressively allocated city and state funds for public housing construction 
and worked closely with the federal government to receive a substantial 
portion of the funds allocated in the wake of the Housing Act of 1949.100 
Public housing fit in well to the city’s strong social support network 
at the time. In the 1930s and 1940s, New York City embodied a unique 
place in American history because of the scope of social programs funded 
by the city.101 Historian Joshua Freeman terms New York at this time a 
“social democratic polity . . . a laboratory for a social urbanism commit-
ted to an expansive welfare state, racial equality, and popular access to 
culture and education,” in opposition to the hegemonic vision of “subur-
ban-style, single-family home living, racially exclusive neighborhoods, 
and low taxes.”102 Public housing was carefully carved out to occupy a 
specific place in American urban life and was designed so as to not hinder 
the growth of the suburbs and the true American ideal of the single-family 
home.103 
2. The Fiscal Crisis of the Mid-1970s, the End of Public Housing 
Construction, and the Ideology of Austerity 
In the mid-1970s, New York City experienced a near-bankruptcy 
that would irrevocably alter approaches to municipal spending and lead 
to a steady increase in the government’s reliance on the private sector to 
provide public goods. While NYCHA survived the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis with its budget largely intact, the fiscal crisis in New York 
and larger national recessions of the 1970s signaled an ideological shift 
away from the New Deal politics that had permitted the rise of NYCHA 
in the first half of the 20th century.104 In its place, a new class of econo-
mists and politicians began touting and implementing a new neoliberal 
agenda: one in which the government approached providing services with 
skepticism rather than considering things like jobs, healthcare, housing, 
and food to be rights.105 Much like the philanthropists who shaped public 
 
 99 See BLOOM, supra note 26, at 110-14. 
 100 Id. at 117. 
 101 See FREEMAN, supra note 78, at 55; Esther B. Fein, For Families Struggling to Get By, 
City Projects Offer a Home For Hope, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 1986), https://perma.cc/CXM8-
LT4M. 
 102 FREEMAN, supra note 78, at 55. 
 103 MCCARTY, supra note 98, at 2, 5. 
 104 Chris Maisano, The Fall of Working-Class New York, JACOBIN (July 11, 2017), https://
perma.cc/S9FT-SCBH. 
 105 Id. 
2020] THE FIGHT FOR NYCHA 297 
housing in the late-19th and early-20th centuries, public discourse once 
again began to treat poverty as a moral failing that could be overcome if 
certain restrictions and contingencies were placed on people’s ability to 
receive services.106 
The fiscal crisis, which began in earnest in 1975, was caused by a 
complicated mix of factors: on the local level, white flight and the loss of 
manufacturing jobs in the city meant a swift devastation of the municipal 
tax base, and the city was forced to carry a larger share of Medicaid costs 
after the federal government slashed its contribution.107 On the federal 
level, the country was still in the depths of a recession that had started 
with the oil crisis in 1973, hurting local economies nationwide.108 As a 
result, banks began to refuse to extend credit to New York City, which in 
turn began defaulting on its loans, quickly resulting in the city being 
pushed nearly to the edge of bankruptcy. To stave off financial ruin, the 
state passed the Financial Emergency Act, which created the Emergency 
Financial Control Board (EFCB, later renamed the FCB), an entity com-
posed of the governor, mayor, and several business leaders.109 For years 
after, the FCB had enormous power—with hardly any oversight—to de-
termine the budgets for most city and state funding.110 
The fiscal crisis gave rise to what came to be known as “austerity 
politics,” where an unelected board imposes mandatory cuts on municipal 
spending ostensibly as a means to balance the budget because the local 
government has failed to do so on their own.111 Much of the EFCB’s focus 
in the immediate years following the crisis had to do with municipal ser-
vices: the City University of New York instituted a tuition for the first 
time in its history, firefighter services were seriously curtailed, and there 
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was a protracted fight with the municipal labor union DC-37 over the 
wages and benefits of city workers.112 NYCHA budgets were not imme-
diately affected, although the economic ideology that began to take shape 
in the 1970s would ultimately have a dire impact on the fiscal health of 
PHAs nationwide.113 
The draconian budget cuts to municipal services in New York City 
took place within a broader national shift towards neoconservative eco-
nomics in the 1970s. The shift began in the Milton Friedman economic 
school of thought in the 1960s as a fiscally conservative response to the 
New Deal and the War on Poverty, culminating in eight years of federal 
budget cuts under President Reagan.114 During this time, deregulation and 
trickle-down economics went “from bunk theory to federal mandate.”115 
As Kim Phillips-Fein notes: 
The crisis brought about a transformation of the very language 
and conception of politics, as the rhetoric of fiscal necessity and 
business acumen replaced a vision of politics as a domain of 
struggle and negotiation . . . . The old faith in the political im-
portance of the working class, the New Deal sense of the necessity 
of government action, gave way in the fiscal crisis to a liberalism 
that borrowed its framework and its values from the private sec-
tor.116 
Indeed, the rise of austerity politics worked in tandem with a rhetor-
ical shift in American public discourse: no longer was this the country of 
President Roosevelt and massive public works projects. Instead, President 
Nixon placed a moratorium on new public housing construction in 
1973,117 and Congress created the Section 8 voucher program in 1974 to 
encourage low-income tenants to begin renting in the private market.118 
One of the ways to understand how the austerity measures of the 
1970s laid the foundation for modern fiscal policy is through the theoret-
ical framework laid out by Naomi Klein in The Shock Doctrine. Klein 
argues that Milton Friedman’s neoliberal school of thought (a regime of 
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deregulation and privatization) was only able to assert itself on a large 
scale through “disaster capitalism,” or “crisis to capital”—that is, “or-
chestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, 
combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market opportuni-
ties.”119 Friedman coined a version of Klein’s phrase himself in the early 
1970s, when he described his plan for aggressive privatization and dereg-
ulation in Pinochet’s Chile as a “shock treatment.”120 Klein identifies a 
shock doctrine at work in disasters as diffuse as Friedman’s so-called 
shock treatment of Chile, New Orleans’s complete transformation into a 
city of charter schools after Hurricane Katrina, and the flood of private 
contractors that have done most of the fighting in the Iraq War.121 
During the fiscal crisis, some New York City officials proposed 
budget cuts similar in severity to those envisioned by Friedman. “Planned 
shrinkage” was a concept proposed by Roger Starr. Originally an advo-
cate for affordable housing,122 Starr became the city’s housing commis-
sioner during the fiscal crisis and grew disenchanted with government 
spending, eventually spouting an almost comically-drawn austerity 
agenda that hinged on the racist exclusion of the outer boroughs and low-
income neighborhoods from city services.123 Starr’s plan was simple: the 
“withdrawal of capital and services from such neighborhoods in hopes the 
devastation would drive the poor from the city.”124 He put it rather 
bluntly: 
Stop Puerto Ricans and the rural blacks from living in the 
city  . . . . Our urban system is based on the theory of taking the 
peasant and turning him into an industrial worker. Now there are 
no industrial jobs. Why not keep him a peasant. Better a thriving 
city of five million than a Calcutta of seven million.125 
While Starr may not have been advocating this sinister plot as a 
means of eventually privatizing those services, his desire to cut services 
to poor communities of color at this time was not uncommon and ulti-
mately created the disastrous conditions of neglect that laid the foundation 
for privatization.126 Starr’s racist budget-slashing could also be found on 
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the national level. In reference to public housing, President Nixon in 1973 
declared in a radio address that “we must stop programs that have been 
turning the Federal Government into a nationwide slumlord.”127 Nixon’s 
cuts to public housing funding were the first in a series of budget cuts over 
the next few decades, which in turn led to the rapid deterioration of public 
housing.128 While The Shock Doctrine explores instances of disaster cap-
italism that happened rapidly, the failure of public housing took decades 
of defunding and neglect to develop, thereby winning popular support for 
privatization.129 
3. Budget Cuts to Public Housing After the Rise of Austerity 
Politics 
While NYCHA was able to maintain its housing stock through the 
budget cuts of the 1980s, the cuts became precipitously steeper in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, leading to rapid physical deterioration and mis-
management and ultimately setting the stage for HUD to pressure the 
agency to begin RAD conversions.130 This was the legacy of austerity 
politics: starve a public good of the resources it needs to function; blame 
the people who rely on that good as truly at fault when it begins to fail; 
and then turn to the private market as the only viable solution to keep the 
public good functioning. So powerful and pervasive was this narrative as 
formulated and pushed by Milton Friedman, by Ronald Reagan, and by 
New York City officials like Roger Starr that the creation of RAD in the 
early 2010s came not from a conservative think tank, but from the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in President 
Obama’s administration.131 
NYCHA has always been mostly funded by grants from HUD (as 
well as federal housing agencies that existed prior to HUD), along with 
smaller city and state subsidies.132 As a result, public housing has largely 
been at the mercy of shifting political winds at the national level for dec-
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ades. As the nation moved farther away from New Deal public works pro-
grams and towards the laissez-faire ideology of the 1980s, the federal 
government began to cut HUD’s budget in more drastic ways, thus im-
pacting the subsidies available to local agencies like NYCHA.133 
Serious budget cuts began with Reagan’s anti-spending stance in the 
1980s. In his decision to cut social services, Reagan was heavily influ-
enced by Milton Friedman and his disparaging attitude towards the poor. 
In one speech, he quoted Friedman, saying, “When you start paying peo-
ple to be poor, you wind up with an awful lot of poor people.”134 From 
1980 to 1988, Reagan slashed HUD’s budget from approximately $36 
billion to $15 billion.135 A top HUD official under Reagan was quoted as 
saying, “We’re getting out of the housing business. Period.”136 
Budget cuts from conservative politicians on the state and local level 
in New York soon followed. In the 1990s, New York Governor Pataki 
began slashing public housing funding by terminating the operating sub-
sidies for 15 state-financed public housing developments.137 When Mi-
chael Bloomberg began his term as mayor of New York City in the early 
2000s, he continued this policy and terminated operating subsidies for an-
other six city-financed developments.138 Bloomberg also required 
NYCHA to cover the costs of the NYPD policing their property, amount-
ing to some $100 million by the end of his mayoral terms.139 
While the city and state began slashing the budget for public housing 
where they could, the cuts were most significant on the federal level. Be-
tween 2001 and 2013, NYCHA estimated their cumulative operating sub-
sidy loss from the federal government to be approximately $1 billion.140 
The gap between NYCHA’s Physical Needs Assessment, which is con-
ducted every five years, and federal funding provided to NYCHA was 
even greater. In 2006, NYCHA’s five-year capital need for repairs was 
$6.9 billion; in 2011, it was approximately $16.8 billion; and in 2017, it 
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had reached a staggering $31.8 billion.141 Throughout this time, federal 
funding based on five-year capital needs assessments never even hit $5 
billion.142 
As budget cuts increased, buildings swiftly physically deteriorated. 
NYCHA apartments have deteriorated more rapidly in the 21st century 
than any time in their history due to a combination of an aging housing 
stock and the cumulative effect of federal neglect.143 In 2002, fewer than 
20% of public housing residents reported three or more “deficiencies” in 
the condition of their apartments; by 2011, that number had jumped to 
approximately 35%.144 Whole developments went without heat for entire 
winters.145 Other issues frequently reported include rodent infestations, 
lack of hot water, and mold accumulation.146 In 2018, NYCHA made 
headlines for engaging in a decades-long cover-up of tests showing that 
there are still high levels of lead in NYCHA apartments.147 According to 
NYCHA, the current breakdown of spending required to repair its build-
ings includes almost $11 billion in repairs to exteriors of the buildings, $6 
billion for building-wide services like boilers and elevators, $12.5 billion 
for individual apartment renovations, and $2.5 billion in repairs to play-
grounds and sidewalks—$32 billion in total.148 
II. HUD’S CREATION OF THE RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION 
PROGRAM 
The RAD program has developed against a backdrop of both in-
tended and unintended crises that have left NYCHA crumbling. As dis-
cussed next, Ocean Bay, a development in Far Rockaway, was chosen as 
the first RAD site because of the severe damage wrought by Hurricane 
Sandy, a natural disaster similar to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.149 
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The revelations that NYCHA failed to remove lead paint from thousands 
of apartments and then intentionally covered it up, which has led to fed-
eral lawsuits against NYCHA, may also be speeding up the process by 
which RAD conversions are taking place.150 Crises, whether intentional 
like Roger Starr’s concept of “planned shrinkage,” or natural like Hurri-
cane Sandy, have become vehicles through which our public goods can 
become private. RAD is by no means a complete privatization of 
NYCHA, but, as outlined in this Note, it is a bold step in that direction, 
and very much follows the trajectory of crisis-to-capital laid out by Naomi 
Klein. By relying so heavily on private funds, public housing joins a long 
list of public institutions that suffered from decades of neglect and have 
been handed over to the private market with decidedly mixed results: 
charter schools, hospital and other medical services, and prisons, to name 
a few.151 NYCHA historian Nicolas Bloom explicitly ties RAD to privat-
ization efforts in other sectors of society: “like charter schools, [RAD] 
can be an important program for residents who want dramatic changes 
and are willing to cast their lot with the private sector.”152 
RAD came into being via a federal appropriations bill in late 2011.153 
Congress, long skeptical of providing any kind of increased assistance to 
PHAs, was willing to give the program a try because it was revenue neu-
tral and would not require any increase in federal funding, as the private 
entities involved could take on debt to finance repairs that the PHAs could 
 
 150 Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Frank G. Runyeon, NYCHA Has a New Plan to Clean Up Rats, 
Mold and Lead Paint: Bring in Private Landlords, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/VQ2R-UP8U. See also Complaint, United States v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 
18-cv-05213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), https://perma.cc/RG44-QTGF (filing by U.S. against NYCHA 
for their failure to protect children from lead paint in the complexes); HUD & N.Y.C. HOUS. 
AUTH., AGREEMENT (Jan. 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/HGJ4-AVGN (Consent Decree after 
lead paint lawsuit brought by the U.S. against NYCHA). 
 151 Eliza Shapiro, Why Some of the Country’s Best Urban Schools Are Facing a Reckon-
ing, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/6BAT-GZY7 (charter schools); Defend Pub-
lic Hospitals, N.Y. STATE NURSES ASS’N, https://perma.cc/PEC2-J48M (last visited May 5, 
2020); Elaine Gartelos, After Medicaid was Privatized, I Went From a ‘Normal’ Life to Spend-
ing Most of the Time in Bed, DES MOINES REGISTER (Jan. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/5ZGQ-
2RPH (health care services); PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/D2SF-3VVF; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING OF CONTRACT 
PRISONS, (Aug. 2016), https://perma.cc/XDG3-5NX7 (private prisons). Even prior HUD ex-
periments in public-private partnerships have had mixed results: Rachel M. Cohen, Donald 
Trump and the GOP are Expanding a Controversial Obama-Era Public Housing Program, 
THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 2, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://perma.cc/ZQA7-AUL4. 
 152 Bloom, supra note 16. 
 153 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, 
125 Stat. 552 (2011). https://perma.cc/RWJ7-JL2J. 
304 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:283 
not on their own.154 While Congress initially conceived of RAD as a 
small-scale program (hence the inclusion of “demonstration” in its name), 
PHAs across the nation and HUD quickly began to see it as a faster way 
to fill public housing budget gaps.155 By 2014, Secretary Castro began 
pushing for much wider implementation of the program, expanding the 
number of RAD-eligible units from 60,000 to 185,000 in just two years.156 
Cash-strapped PHAs across the nation have quickly turned to RAD 
as a possible solution for their massive budget gaps. By fall of 2016, just 
a few years into this small pilot program, 400 PHAs across the country 
had submitted 1,000 applications.157 As of 2019, the cap on the number 
of units in the program had been extended to 455,000.158 Advocates have 
expressed concern that “the RAD program has nearly quadrupled in size 
over the last five years without any evaluation of its impact on tenants.”159 
HUD itself quantifies RAD success in terms of how many units enter the 
program, not the impact on tenants themselves160 and, according to a letter 
sent to HUD by housing advocates, has made it difficult for tenant organ-
izations to review relevant documents and contract proposals before the 
deals are made between the local PHA and HUD.161 
In general terms, a PHA that enters a RAD contract with HUD prom-
ises to convert public housing units from Section 9 of the Housing Act of 
1937 to Section 8 vouchers by decreasing federal subsidies to local hous-
ing authorities and bringing in private property managers that will collect 
rent, manage day-to-day affairs of the building, and use private capital to 
cover repairs and maintenance.162 Since creation of the Section 8 program 
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in the 1970s, HUD funding has generally favored Section 8 over the Sec-
tion 9 programs under which NYCHA was originally created.163 By cut-
ting funding for traditional Section 9 public housing, RAD continues a 
nationwide trend towards Section 8 vouchers: 
HUD will no longer provide RAD buildings with direct funding 
for public housing, and the units will no longer be reserved as 
public housing. As HUD continues to cut funding for public hous-
ing, it will force more housing authorities to apply for RAD fund-
ing to keep their buildings in shape, resulting in more public-pri-
vate funding.164 
RAD also encourages public housing residents to enter the private 
market—after one or two years of participation in RAD, depending on the 
kind of voucher the tenant receives, they are eligible to apply for a tenant-
based voucher, rather than the project-based Section 8 voucher they ini-
tially receive when RAD is put in place.165 
RAD is a public-private partnership because the PHA still retains 
ownership of the land, and the private landlord enters into a long-term 
lease with the housing authority in order to collect rent and manage the 
day-to-day affairs of the building.166 How this looks in practice will vary 
depending on the PHA: in Baltimore, for example, the private property 
managers actually purchased a majority share in the buildings and re-
ceived low-income housing tax credits (LIHTC) for doing so;167 for 
NYCHA, as described below, NYCHA itself still owns the buildings 
while the new landlord leases the properties.168 In contrast to Hope VI, 
which forced tenants into the private market, tenants are guaranteed the 
same rights and obligations that were already in place.169 Beyond these 
basic terms, implementation of RAD differs depending on the needs of 
the housing authority and the contract between HUD, the housing author-
ity, and the private landlord.170 
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Although PHAs are typically deeply in debt, investors have been at-
tracted to RAD because it is a reasonably safe, low-risk opportunity with 
a stable revenue stream guaranteed by the federal government.171 Before 
RAD, PHAs were barred from seeking private investment on their own, 
but with the RAD agreement in place, they are permitted to collaborate 
with private investors to mortgage the property and seek private fund-
ing.172 HUD encourages PHAs to raise money in a variety of ways, usu-
ally through a combination of the PHA mortgaging the property and en-
couraging private investors to utilize LIHTC.173 LIHTC is a lucrative tax 
break program for developers who are constructing or maintaining afford-
able housing, sometimes providing a “dollar-for-dollar reduction in their 
federal tax liability.”174 
A RAD regulatory agreement also promotes a low-risk investment 
opportunity by putting in place a Housing Assistance Program (HAP) 
contract, the mechanism by which Section 9 public housing units are con-
verted to Section 8 housing vouchers.175 As a HUD report from 2016 
noted, “[t]he long-term Section 8 contract under RAD provides those pro-
jects with a stable and predictable revenue stream that is essential to meet-
ing the underwriting requirements of the lenders who provide that 
debt.”176 Investors are attracted by the money freed up from the mortgage, 
the reliable stream of Section 8 money, and the lucrative federal tax cred-
its.177 
Responses from housing advocates to RAD’s creation and imple-
mentation have been hopeful, if skeptical. Whereas prior Republican 
presidents like Reagan and Bush had done nothing but slash HUD’s 
budget, and Clinton had presided over the violent demolition process of 
HOPE VI, Julián Castro’s HUD was actually trying to rescue public hous-
ing by locating and encouraging new sources of revenue. An investigation 
 
ONSTRATION USE AGREEMENT: FORM HUD- 52625 (Dec. 2019), https://perma.cc/7ZTE-
XLA9, for boilerplate HUD agreement prepared for NYCHA housing. 
 171 Rico Cleffi, The Vultures Are Circling NYCHA, INDYPENDENT (Feb. 1, 2019), https://
perma.cc/9QER-9X7V. 
 172 Roller & Cassella, supra note 1; Khafagy, supra note 4. 
 173 ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 157, at xv. 
 174 Affordable Housing Resource Center: About the LIHTC, NOVOGRADAC (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2020). https://perma.cc/RGW8-8M7P. 
 175 ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 157, at xxi. See also HUD, RENTAL ASSISTANCE 
DEMONSTRATION (RAD): QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS 
CONVERTING TO PROJECT-BASED VOUCHER (PBV) ASSISTANCE 5-6 (Oct. 2014), https://
perma.cc/WT76-GV5G. 
 176 See ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 157, at xxi, 49-51 (“[F]or every $1 invested by 
the PHA, private investors put in $3.91 in federal tax credits ($1.90 for 9-percent LIHTC 
equity + $2.01 for 4-percent LIHTC equity . . . .”). 
 177 Id. 
2020] THE FIGHT FOR NYCHA 307 
into NYCHA’s first RAD conversion, Ocean Bay Apartments, noted that 
“public-private partnerships come in all moral flavors . . . [a]t least in its 
early stages, RAD seems to be settling at the virtuous end of the spec-
trum.”178 
III. IMPLEMENTING RAD IN NEW YORK CITY, OR NYCHA 2.0 
A. NYCHA 2.0 
In December 2018, NYCHA and the New York City Mayor’s Office 
announced NYCHA 2.0, a sweeping plan to generate revenue for mainte-
nance and repairs in NYCHA buildings.179 Altogether, the plan expects to 
generate approximately $23.8 billion over 10 years, out of the $31.8 bil-
lion required to meet the agency’s 2017 five-year capital needs assess-
ment.180 The plan contains three main components: the RAD program, in-
fill projects, and the sale of air rights. First, NYCHA will implement 
RAD, with the goal of converting around one-third of NYCHA apart-
ments to Section 8 within 10 years. The partnership between NYCHA and 
HUD to implement the RAD program is called “Permanent Affordability 
Commitment Together” (PACT).181 PACT is expected to generate the 
most significant revenue out of the three components of the plan, totaling 
$12.8 billion over 10 years.182 
The second component of NYCHA 2.0 is the in-fill program, called 
“Build to Preserve,” which will lease NYCHA land to developers to build 
apartment towers on what are termed “underutilized” portions of NYCHA 
space, including parking lots and playgrounds.183 Developers would be 
required to pay for at least some of the capital needs of the NYCHA de-
velopment on which they construct.184 Some of the new developments 
will be required to make 50% of the units set at levels of affordability 
determined by the Area Median Income,185 a disputed measure of afford-
ability that still frequently sets rents much higher than are affordable for 
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working-class communities, while others will be required to use Manda-
tory Inclusionary Housing guidelines: that is, roughly 70% of the units 
will have rents set at the market rate, while approximately 30% of the 
units will be affordable.186 In-fill projects have so far faced the fiercest 
community opposition, and all of the proposed projects are currently 
stalled.187 
Finally, the third component of NYCHA 2.0 is for NYCHA to gen-
erate some revenue by selling air-rights to adjacent real estate developers 
to allow them to construct taller buildings.188 Developers will also be re-
quired to include some number of affordable units in such buildings.189 
The first project to actually go through, in Fort Greene, will allow the 
developer to build 400 units, as opposed to an initial projection of 187 
without the purchase of the air-rights; 25% of these will be set aside as 
affordable, and the NYCHA development, Ingersoll Houses, will receive 
$25 million out of an estimated $159 million required for repairs.190 
Much like RAD, both the in-fill projects and sale of air-rights purport 
to raise sorely needed money in the short term but do little to examine the 
long-term effects on NYCHA tenants, or gentrification in the city as a 
whole. In-fill projects will destroy the parking lots and playgrounds that 
NYCHA tenants, who have struggled through decades of aforementioned 
neglect and disrepair, have grown to rely on to foster their communi-
ties.191 The above-mentioned air rights sale in Fort Greene in Ingersoll 
Houses might provide some injection of capital to meet repair needs, but 
it will also bring hundreds of new luxury units to a neighborhood already 
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inundated with expensive apartments and struggling against the effects of 
gentrification.192 Moreover, the one-time payment to Ingersoll Houses for 
repairs is only a fraction of what the development needs now, and there is 
no obligation for the developer to meet the rest of these capital repair 
needs, or needs that may surface in the future.193 
B. Ocean Bay, the First RAD Pilot Project for NYCHA 
The first NYCHA development to undergo a RAD conversion was 
the Ocean Bay Apartments in Far Rockaway. With almost 1,400 apart-
ments and 4,000 residents,194 Ocean Bay has experienced decades-long 
neglect typical of many NYCHA developments, including deteriorating 
apartments, spotty heat, and crumbling exteriors.195 What made Ocean 
Bay stand out as a good target for the first NYCHA RAD conversion was 
the development’s ability to access FEMA money after Hurricane 
Sandy.196 Situated in Far Rockaway, Ocean Bay was particularly hard-hit 
after Sandy: tenants suffered from lack of heat, intermittent electricity, 
and leaking gas lines for weeks after the storm.197 Along with city and 
state support, the stable revenue of FEMA money helped encourage pri-
vate investment for the pilot program.198 Klein’s theory of disaster capi-
talism is highly relevant here—much like New Orleans public schools 
after Hurricane Katrina, long-neglected NYCHA housing most impacted 
by Hurricane Sandy became the best place to convince the public of the 
merits of privatization.199 
Financing for the Ocean Bay development comes from a complicated 
mix of public and private funds, and a number of entities are involved. At 
the front is the property manager Wavecrest Management, which is now 
the landlord for the 4,000 Ocean Bay residents.200 As landlord, they are 
in charge of collecting rent, handling tenant grievances, taking tenants to 
court for nonpayment or lease violations, and overseeing day-to-day re-
pairs. Backing Wavecrest are the investors. Investments have come in 
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from some of the most prominent banks in the country: both Goldman 
Sachs and Citibank have invested millions in the project.201 In total, ap-
proximately $560 million in public and private money has been raised to 
complete renovations like updating kitchens and replacing the develop-
ment’s boiler system.202 Renovations will be carried out by the contractor 
MDG Design + Construction.203 The non-profit Catholic Charities of 
Brooklyn and Queens is also receiving funding to provide on-site social 
services.204 
In the few short years that Wavecrest Management has managed 
Ocean Bay, interviews with residents indicate that at least some badly 
needed repairs are being completed, and some residents are glad that work 
is finally being done.205 One investigation reports that “improvements 
such as new kitchens, renovated apartments, and increased security have 
all given residents an overdue feeling of relief from the decades of decay 
and despair.”206 Mold that had been accumulating in apartments since 
Hurricane Sandy has been mitigated, and a new boiler system installed.207 
Wavecrest has been completing desperately needed repairs, but some 
residents worry that the changes are merely “cosmetic” and do not address 
ongoing structural problems with buildings.208 Although Wavecrest is 
charged with maintaining the properties that they operate by law, the reg-
ulatory agreement with HUD that installs Wavecrest as the property man-
ager does not require it to inject so much capital into the buildings ever 
again, meaning that Wavecrest is most likely front-loading repairs and 
will not perform such large infrastructure work again.209 There are also 
signs that Wavecrest is acting more aggressively to remove tenants. Since 
2017, Ocean Bay residents have experienced the highest number of evic-
tions of any NYCHA development—more than double that of the next 
highest development.210 Many of these cases, at least thus far, are the re-
sult of bureaucratic miscommunications and mismanagement between 
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Wavecrest and HUD and the residents.211 As discussed below, this lack 
of oversight and mismanagement has been an issue in RAD conversions 
across the country. Additionally, housing lawyers who have represented 
tenants who live in buildings owned by Wavecrest Management in other 
parts of the city describe Wavecrest as a “slumlord” that fails to do nec-
essary repairs.212 
C. Advocates’ Concerns and Uncertainties with RAD’s Implementation 
Over the last two years, as it became clear that NYCHA would heav-
ily invest in RAD, advocates have identified a number of issues in the 
way the program is being implemented that could have adverse impacts 
on tenants.213 One major concern amongst advocates has to do with how 
many of the rights of public housing tenants will remain, and how many 
will change as they become Section 8 tenants.214 NYCHA tenants will 
begin to have different obligations and be governed by a different set of 
regulations as Section 8 tenants. Adding to the confusion, NYCHA ten-
ants will continue to have certain reporting obligations to NYCHA, which 
administers the Section 8 program, and other obligations to their new 
landlords.215 Tenants will continue to fill out their annual recertification, 
which tracks their household composition and income, and send this in-
formation to NYCHA.216 They will pay rent to their new landlord, and 
will have to contact the landlord about any repair issues.217 The new land-
lords will also be responsible for taking tenants to housing court for nor-
mal landlord-tenant issues like nonpayment of rent or violations of the 
lease.218 However, NYCHA can also move to terminate the Section 8 
voucher under Section 8 regulations, which can lead to a separate admin-
istrative hearing with NYCHA.219 
The mechanism by which PHAs are converted to RAD is a multi-
step procedure that also remains a point of concern.220 One of the main 
issues with RAD conversions that has faced opposition in other PHAs is 
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tenants’ rights to return after renovations to their apartments have been 
completed.221 Under RAD, HUD regulations guarantee residents the right 
to return if they are temporarily relocated while renovations of their apart-
ments occur.222 However, there have already been documented instances 
of PHAs, in conjunction with the newly present private landlords, violat-
ing this procedure and refusing to allow families to return to their apart-
ments. In Spokane, Washington, for example, residents were re-screened 
for household income because the private landlord was receiving LIHTC, 
which has its own income requirements, and households that were found 
to be over-income were not allowed to return to their apartments.223 HUD 
promises that no RAD tenants will be re-screened in such a manner.224 
NYCHA also claims that tenants will not be re-screened,225 although pri-
vate investors in New York involved in RAD are actively seeking the 
same federal tax credits, LIHTC, that were applied for in Spokane.226 
In Hopewell, Virginia, residents of a RAD-converted public housing 
development settled a lawsuit in 2017 with HUD over violations of the 
Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and HUD regula-
tions during and after the conversion process.227 The development was 
completely demolished and rebuilt under RAD, and the complaints and a 
subsequent HUD investigation found that the new private manager and 
the PHA denied existing residents the right to return, coerced them into 
leaving with buyout offers, refused to provide reasonable accommodation 
to residents with disabilities, and harassed families with young chil-
dren.228 
Illegal evictions are also a concern. In 2018, Disability Rights Mar-
yland filed a complaint with HUD over illegal evictions at RAD-
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converted housing in Baltimore.229 The complaint cited such issues as de-
fective notices, failure to notify residents of their right to request a hear-
ing, confusing letters, and premature filings of breach-of-lease com-
plaints.230 The group found at least seven cases in 2017 in which residents 
were improperly evicted.231 
Although NYCHA tenants are not supposed to be re-examined for 
their household income, they are re-assessed to determine whether they 
are living in an apartment that is the right size for their household com-
position, under a process known as “rightsizing.”232 Tenants “have the 
right to return to the same property, but not necessarily the same unit.”233 
Rightsizing carries its own concern, since new landlords will be inspect-
ing apartments and bringing eviction actions against people who are not 
in the household composition.234 Although NYCHA officially has ap-
proximately 400,000 residents, unofficial estimates put the number closer 
to 600,000.235 Since residents who are not included in the household com-
position can be evicted from NYCHA apartments, the additional inspec-
tions that occur due to RAD will make up to 200,000 people vulnerable 
to eviction proceedings.236 
Community input during RAD conversions and rights of resident or-
ganizations (ROs are like Tenant Associations for NYCHA) are also 
points of contention. Although in the lead-up to the Ocean Bay conver-
sion, community meetings were held to educate residents on what the 
RAD program is, advocates say that “it is unclear whether or how resident 
and community preferences can be exercised in the conversion pro-
cess.”237 NYCHA says that resident organizations, which have been a 
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powerful force for community engagement in NYCHA developments for 
decades, will continue to be funded by the new private landlord.238 Curi-
ously, a new RAD handbook notes that the property manager will be per-
mitted to take 40% of the funds for “administration,” although the specif-
ics of this term are not defined.239 
Advocates are also concerned about the types of vouchers that ten-
ants are receiving as part of the transition from Section 9 to Section 8 
housing. As stated earlier, tenants in RAD apartments are being given 
Section 8 vouchers, like low-income tenants who receive a subsidy to rent 
in the private market. Although all tenants are receiving Section 8 vouch-
ers, the apartments themselves are being converted under different pro-
grams: the majority of the apartments are being converted under RAD, 
but a percentage are being converted under a section of the Housing Act 
called Section 18.240 While Section 18 is mainly used to demolish public 
housing, it can also be used to “dispose” of units, like in the case of RAD 
conversions.241 The key difference is that the type of voucher HUD issues 
is based on whether the apartment is converted under RAD or Section 18. 
As of now, it is unclear how or even which apartments are being desig-
nated for Section 18 or RAD. 
Private landlords are interested in this distinction because the Section 
18 vouchers are more lucrative, and one investigation notes: 
RAD and Section 18 function differently. RAD converts 
NYCHA’s existing federal HUD funding—for both capital re-
pairs (such as roofs and boilers) and everyday maintenance—
into Project Based Vouchers that can be used for privately run 
projects. Section 18, meanwhile, unlocks more lucrative Tenant 
Protection Vouchers: Where RAD vouchers only pay the differ-
ence between residents’ rent (set at 30 percent of their adjusted 
gross income) and $1,220 a month, TPVs can cover the gap all 
the way up to $2,014 a month.242 
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The more Section 18 apartments a private landlord includes in their 
contract with HUD to convert to RAD, the more they will receive in sub-
sidies.243 Under the current NYCHA 2.0 plan, a significant majority of 
NYCHA units are actually projected to be converted through the TPV 
voucher system.244 
There are serious issues around the ongoing affordability of apart-
ments that are being converted under Section 18. As advocates pointed 
out in a letter to NYCHA in early 2019: 
RAD provides assurances of ongoing affordability that are not 
matched under Section 18. Under federal law and HUD regula-
tions, RAD requires that, at the end of the 20-year rent assistance 
contract, HUD must offer to renew the contract and the owner 
must accept the offer, thereby guaranteeing ongoing affordability. 
In contrast, Section 18 TPVs are a budget line item subject to an-
nual Congressional appropriations. There is no assurance that 
Congress will appropriate the funds needed for the large number 
of Section 18 conversions that NYCHA envisions, or that Section 
18 rent assistance contracts will be sustained after they end in 20 
years.245 
Not only is funding for Section 18 more tenuous, but the specific 
kind of voucher attached to Section 18 apartments provides tenants with 
fewer rights. Since Section 18 is normally used to dispose of or demolish 
public housing, it does not have the built-in tenant protections public 
housing residents have, such as succession rights, a grievance procedure, 
and the right to organize resident associations.246 HUD has promulgated 
regulations that will require developments that apply for RAD to limit the 
number of units converted under Section 18 to 25% of the total number 
in the development.247 If the development chooses to convert units under 
Section 18, HUD requires that the development extend the same tenant 
protections to all residents, regardless of whether they are living in a RAD 
unit or a Section 18 unit.248 What is alarming, however, is that some of 
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the recent applications from NYCHA for RAD conversions have re-
quested well over 25% of the units to be converted under Section 18: ad-
vocates note that NYCHA is requesting approval for a development in 
Bushwick to contain 58% Section 18 units and only 42% RAD units.249 
If HUD begins approving plans that contain more than 25% Section 18 
units, it is unclear if Section 18 residents will still be guaranteed the same 
rights as residents in RAD apartments.250 
Finally, the RAD Use Agreements entered into by the new private 
property manager and HUD—which regulates the setting of rents as well 
as income requirements for residents—permit acceptance of higher-in-
come residents (those making 80% of AMI) upon termination of the con-
tract for breach or noncompliance.251 The agreement also allows HUD to 
authorize reductions in the total number of rent-restricted units where the 
owner is “unable . . . to otherwise provide for the financial viability of the 
project.” 252 
Much like the other components of NYCHA 2.0, the in-fill projects 
and the air-rights sales, RAD promises a quick influx of cash for tenants 
who have suffered nothing but divestment and poor maintenance for dec-
ades. In the short-term, as promised, new investors are providing enough 
funding to do cosmetic repairs, which are indeed necessary.253 But in the 
long-term, there are a number of uncertainties, particularly for the mainte-
nance of the “public” half of this public-private partnership. There is little 
oversight from HUD for a program that requires serious enforcement to 
ensure tenants maintain the same rights they had under traditional public 
housing. 254 There is no readily apparent incentive for the new private 
landlords to invest more seriously down the line in infrastructure up-
grades. Inevitably, much like other public spheres that have succumbed 
to privatization in the United States, the momentum only goes in one di-
rection. As Naomi Klein says: 
[D]isaster capitalists (referring to the private companies that take 
over the public sphere in the wake of a man-made or natural dis-
aster) have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka 
and New Orleans, the process deceptively called “reconstruction” 
began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing 
what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then 
 
 249 CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y ET AL., supra note 215. 
 250 See id. 
 251 HUD, RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION USE AGREEMENT: FORM HUD- 52625, su-
pra note 170, at 3. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Whitford, supra note 13. 
 254 Roller & Cassella, supra note 1. 
2020] THE FIGHT FOR NYCHA 317 
quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Je-
rusalem.255 
There will be more pressures to further privatize: from HUD, as the 
agency continues to struggle with an ever-shrinking budget; from the 
PHAs themselves, desperate for new sources of revenue; and from the 
private sector itself, which will inevitably require an increasingly greater 
return on its investments. 
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF NYCHA AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR 
PUBLIC HOUSING 
Much of the rhetoric around RAD, even from advocates, takes on a 
resigned air of inevitability, as though privatization, at least partially, is 
the only way to raise funds for public housing. As NYCHA historian Ni-
colas Bloom says, “Given the dominance of the private sector in federal 
policy, and the current balance of power in Washington, those who be-
lieve in purely public housing—the old NYCHA—will have difficulty 
developing an alternative and equally beneficial plan. The ball is in their 
court as the NYCHA 2.0 plan develops.”256 While many longtime 
NYCHA advocates have come to the same conclusion, the air of inevita-
bility given to a market-based solution like RAD will only result in further 
privatization efforts, not only in public housing, but in all public goods 
that we have fought to create and maintain over the course of the 20th 
century. 
One of the debates about the implementation of a program like RAD, 
a public-private partnership, is whether it truly amounts to privatization. 
NYCHA has gone to great lengths to stress that RAD is not privatiza-
tion.257 The public housing residents who have formed Fight for NYCHA, 
however, see things differently.258 They argue, “[B]ecause the New York 
City Council has a non-stop record of turning over strategic assets to the 
private sector—from charity hospitals, to public library branches, to 
parks, and gardens—that [sic] there is a demonstrated failure of leader-
ship to audit Mayor de Blasio’s financial projections for RAD.”259 
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NYCHA activists intuit what theorists like Naomi Klein spelled out, that 
capitalism is never content with small gains when there is the possibility 
of ever-greater profits, particularly when there is an ailing public entity 
that the government will not assist.260 NYCHA developments sit on some 
of the most valuable land in the city.261 Knowing what we do about the 
gargantuan profits of some of the early investors in RAD, like Goldman 
Sachs and Citigroup, and the dependency of these banks on year-over-
year increases, it is likely that they will seek bigger returns from their 
investment into RAD down the line. As outlined above, RAD has many 
built-in protections to ensure that affordable housing is not lost—for now. 
But some of those protections are tenuous, like the Section 18 units that 
are contingent on congressional appropriation funding, or PHAs’ spotty 
records of fulfilling the “right to return” promise in other cities.262 
Given the private sector’s generally poor, sometimes appalling, track 
record when tasked with managing public goods, 263 it is crucial for advo-
cates to think creatively and ambitiously about ways to push federal fund-
ing back toward public housing. Part of this will require an acknowledg-
ment of the United States’ cultural shift toward a nation of renters rather 
than owners, a shift that is already taking place: as more people in the 
country populate urban areas, more of them are renting, and protecting 
affordable rents becomes more important.264 This is to say that we should 
seriously rethink the approximately $134 billion in tax subsidies we pro-
vide to homeowners every year, mostly in the form of mortgage interest 
deductions, which disproportionately benefit wealthy homeowners.265 
Mitchell-Lama, an affordable ownership housing program with its own 
set of issues, did a great deal in the mid-20th century to marshal public 
and private money to build permanently affordable housing.266 While the 
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difficulties of construction and finding land in New York have grown ex-
ponentially worse since those developments were built, it is a program 
worth revisiting if HUD and the city are so keen on using private funds to 
preserve affordable housing. 
Although politically challenging in our current government, there are 
proposals to make public housing funding a renewed priority. The Green 
New Deal for Public Housing, a bill spearheaded by Representative Al-
exandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Bernie Sanders, aims to spend $180 
billion over 10 years to revitalize and upgrade public housing across the 
country with green infrastructure.267 
It is important to remember as well that cities across the globe have 
dedicated resources to keep public housing completely out of the private 
sector. Berlin, which had its own privatization movement for public hous-
ing after the end of the Cold War, is beginning to re-nationalize develop-
ments after years of skyrocketing rents.268 In Singapore, where most res-
idents live in some form of public housing, it is considered “an asset to 
the public purse, as well as a social asset—and carries no stigma.”269 
Ultimately, decent and accessible public housing is achievable in the 
United States—we had it for many years. Instead of turning to a private 
housing market that relies on maximized investment returns, that has and 
continues to extract immense profits from buildings all around public 
housing developments even as they languish and crumble, we should 
acknowledge the destructive and inhumane practices of capitalism while 
simultaneously protecting and strengthening a viable alternative to com-
modified housing. Only a solution that guarantees permanent affordabil-
ity and protections through public control can truly create justice for those 
who have suffered through intense racial segregation, exclusion, and dis-
possession at the hands of federal, state, and city governments, and the 
real estate industry. Public housing is a human right, and NYCHA resi-
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